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SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL:
FEDERAL TOUGH-ON-GUNS PROGRAM TARGETS
MINORITY COMMUNITIES FOR SELECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT
Bonita R. Gardner*
The U.S. Department ofJustice has initiated a nationwide program called Project Safe
Neighborhoods that purports to aggressively enforce gun laws by working with local
and state law enforcement agencies to identify individuals who should receive "harsher
than normal" sentencing. This program targets African American communities, and it
involves enforcement of only two of twentyfederalfireanns laws. Statistics bear out that
the federal government ignores other criminal activity and other criminals engaged in
the same activity as those targeted by Project Safe Neighborhoods.
The impact of Project Safe Neighborhoods has been great. The federal government
devoted more than $900 million in support of the program, and intensive efforts
have resulted in a seventy-three percent increase infederalfirearms prosecutions from
2000-2005. Narrowly-focused, discriminatory firearms prosecutions make worse
the already troubling rates of incarcerationfor African American males.
There have been several challenges to Project Safe Neighborhoods' prosecutions on
the basis that they involve race-based selective enforcement. Courts have applied
selective prosecution law to require proof of disparate impact and discriminatory
intent. But these tests should not govern where the program has not only a disparate
impact, but involves the egregious practice of singling out African Americans for the
express purpose ofjailing them longer than other defendants.
Project Safe Neighborhoods singles out African Americans by targeting only those
communities in which African Americans live. Generally, courts have not considered
geography under equal protection analyses. But the Supreme Court recognized as
early as 1879 in Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, that "a distinct territorial
establishment and jurisdiction might be intended as, or might have the effect of, a
discrimination against a particular race or class, where such race or class should
happen to be the principal occupants of the disfavored district." The reality of
segregation in our communities should not be ignored by the federal government in
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making prosecutorial decisions to target only distinct communities for enforcement of
the law.
Moreover, the narrow focus of Project Safe Neighborhoods violates principles of
federalism, undermines the explicit goals of federal sentencing guidelines to ensure
that similarly situated defendants are treated similarly, and denies African
Americans the most findamental assurance under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment-non-separate and equal treatment under the law.
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INTRODUCTION
The numbers are disturbing. The rate of incarceration for African
American males has reached epidemic proportions. In today's tough-on-
crime atmosphere, is this simply the result of strict enforcement of the
[VOL. 12:305
Separate and Unequal
laws-the "do the crime and you'll do the time" cause and effect?1 Or, as
many scholars have insisted, is there some discrimination in the enforce-
ment of the law that contributes to the disproportionately high
incarceration level of African American males?2 Whatever one's position, it
is undeniable that the increased rate of incarceration for African American
males over the past twenty years has had a devastating impact on African
American communities.
The latest program to have an unquestionably disproportionate im-
pact on African Americans is Project Safe Neighborhoods, the federal
government's tough-on-guns program. Project Safe Neighborhoods is a
collaborative law enforcement effort between local, state and federal law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors' offices. The concept "is disarm-
ingly simple: federal, state and local law enforcement officers and
prosecutors working together to investigate, arrest and prosecute criminals
with guns to get the maximum penalties available under state or federal
law.' 4 That is, teams of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies
and prosecutors' offices coordinate in making charging decisions for those
caught with guns. Local law enforcement officers who arrest individuals
with guns refer those cases either directly to federal investigators or prose-
cutors, or to state prosecutors who may then present the cases to federal
prosecutors.The decision about whether to prosecute the case federally or
in state courts is based on where the sentence will be harsher. The stated
goal is to ensure that the defendants targeted by the program get "the
longest sentences possible." '5
1. See, e.g., MICHAEL ToNRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 49 (1995) (arguing that the rates of incarceration of African American men cor-
relate with their levels of offending); see also WILLIAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (1987) (arguing that the perception of the criminal justice
system as racist is a myth).
2. See CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 66-219
(1993) (arguing that minorities receive unfair treatment at all levels of the court system);
see also Angela J. Davis, Benign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1660 (1996).
3. Evidence shows incarceration is closely associated with low wages, unemploy-
ment, family instability, recidivism, and restrictions on political and social rights. See Becky
Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in
US. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV., 151-169, 151, 153 (2004) (discussing correla-
tion of class and criminal processing). See also JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY:
AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 89-92 (1996) (theorizing that
high rates of incarceration and the violent ethos of the prison system have come to shape
behavior on the streets and to undermine respect for the law).
4. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared remarks at Project Safe Neighbor-
hoods National Conference, Philadelphia, Pa (Jan. 30, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/
archive/ag/speeches/2003/013003agpreparedremarks.htm [hereinafter remarks].
5. Press Release, Debra WYang, L.A. Law Enforcement Officials Roll-Out Project
Safe Neighborhoods (Dec. 18, 2003) http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pr2003/176.html.
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Given the level of cooperation involved and the sharp increase in
federal gun prosecutions as a result of the program, Project Safe
Neighborhoods has been touted as a comprehensive, efficient and success-
ful operation. In reality, the program is a narrowly-applied, reactive effort
aimed at low-level criminals. It is an easily satisfied numbers operation.
And Project Safe Neighborhoods targets African American communities.
Those caught with a gun in one of these communities will be met with
the full weight of federal law and find themselves facing sentences that are
almost uniformly longer than those imposed under comparable state law.
The person caught with a gun in other communities, if prosecuted at all,
will certainly not end up in federal court to face its harsher penalties.
This Article examines the Project Safe Neighborhoods program and
considers whether its disproportionate application in urban, majority-
African American cities (large and small) violates the guarantee of equal
protection under the law. This Article will start with a description of the
program and how it operates-the limited application to street-level
criminal activity in predominately African American communities. Based
on preliminary data showing that Project Safe Neighborhoods dispropor-
tionately impacts African Americans, the Article turns to an analysis of the
applicable law. Most courts have analyzed Project Safe Neighborhoods'
race-based challenges under selective prosecution case law, which requires
a showing by the defendant that the program had a discriminatory impact
and was effectuated with the intent to discriminate. But this case law is
not definitive. Project Safe Neighborhoods is a program that operates to
treat African Americans separately and unequally. The program targets Af-
rican American neighborhoods and thus targets African Americans. Under
well-established law, where a program effectively classifies citizens by race,
it is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary
justification.
The presumed justification for Project Safe Neighborhoods' focus
on a few select federal laws in African American communities is to com-
bat the high rates of crime in these communities. The policy of treating
individuals who happen to live in these high-crime areas more harshly
than those who live elsewhere is not compelling, nor is the program nar-
rowly tailored to accomplish the goal of tough enforcement. The goal of
tough enforcement could easily be met using race-neutral standards.
Moreover, the program makes bad public policy. It targets criminal
activity concurrently enforceable by state governments, and does so at the
cost of failing to enforce exclusive federal gun laws. It undermines the
goals of uniformity in sentencing--the notion that similarly-situated indi-
viduals should be treated similarly-by singling out a segment of the
population for the explicit purpose of treating them differently. And that
the segment of the population so singled out is African American raises
serious questions about the fairness and integrity of a government that
promises equal protection under the law. The program involves separate
[VOL. 12:305
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and unequal treatment. If this is not violative of equal protection, then
what is?
I. MORE ABOUT PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS
Project Safe Neighborhoods was officially announced in May 2001.6
But the program is not as new as its inception date suggests. In April
1991,Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, under the administration of
(the first) George Bush, announced "Project Triggerlock," which would
use federal firearms statutes to "protect the public by putting the most
dangerous offenders in prison for as long as the law allows." 7 The purpose
of the project was to identify repeat and violent offenders who used guns
and to prosecute them in federal court." The project was implemented in
several jurisdictions across the country. Within six months after Trigger-
lock's announcement, 2651 defendants were charged nationwide. 9 The
ATF further responded with "Operation Achilles Heel", an effort to work
with state and local authorities to round up more than 600 of the nation's
"most violent criminals." 0 Project Triggerlock continued through the end
of the Bush administration and into the Clinton Administration."
But the real genesis of Project Safe Neighborhoods was a program
in Richmond, Virginia, called Project Exile. In 1997, the United States
Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Virginia began aggressively
prosecuting handgun offenses. 2 At that time, Richmond was among the
10 cities with the highest per capita murder rates. 3 According to Helen
Fahey, then U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District ofVirginia, the reasons
for pursuing the cases federally were threefold: (1) most offenders could
be held without bail under federal bond statutes; (2) offenders would be
subject to mandatory minimum sentences under federal law, resulting in
stiff penalties; and (3) the offender would not serve time in his commu-
nity, but would be "exiled" to federal prison.14 Under the project, "all
6. See Press Release, White House Project Safe Neighborhoods Fact Sheet,(May
14, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/2001 0514-2.html.
7. Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile" and The Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement
Authority, 43 Asuz. L. REV. 369, 374 (2001) quoting Tracy Thompson, Gun Crimes Targeted
by Prosecutors: National Effort Seen As Partly Political,Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1991, at A14.
8. Richman, supra note 7,at 374.
9. Id. at 375.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Gene Healy, There Goes the Neighborhood: The Bush-Ashcroft Plan to "Help"
Localities Fight Gun Crime, in Go DIRECTLY TO JAIL-THE OVERCRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST
EVERYTHING 94 (Gene Healy ed., 2004).
13. Id., (citing Toni Heinzl, Richmond's Project Exile Criticized by Attorneys, Federal
Judge, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 17, 2000, at 21).
14. Healy, supra note 12, at 95 (citing Helen E Fahey, Testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Mar. 22, 1999).
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felons with guns, guns/drug cases and guns/domestic violence cases in
Richmond [would be] federally prosecuted, without regard to numbers or
quantities.'"
The numbers attributed to the project were impressive. By March
1999, two years after the program's inception, 512 guns had been seized,
and federal prosecutors had secured 438 indictments and 302 convictions
with an average sentence of more than 53 months.1 6 There was a thirty-
three percent reduction in the homicide rate between 1997 and 1998,
giving Richmond its lowest rate since 1987.17 Whether this decline was a
result of Project Exile's success is debatable as gun-related homicides and
other violent crime dropped significantly across the country during the
same period, and criminologists do not agree about the cause of that de-
cline.' 8
Project Exile was lauded by a diverse group of politicians and citi-
zens groups. It was supported by Democrats and Republicans alike. Those
usually opposed on the issue of laws governing the use of guns were
united. Charlton Heston, president of the National Rifle Association
("NRA"), honored the "fearless prosecutors" of Project Exile during
hearings on the project in November 1999.' 9 The NRA contributed
$125,000 to Richmond's Project Exile advertising programs. 20 The NRA's
nemesis, gun-control advocate Sarah Brady2', also endorsed the program.
But a three-judge panel of the Eastern District of Virginia court
early on expressed concern about the prosecutorial discretion exercised in
diverting cases to federal court through Project Exile in light of the dispa-
Americans. 23 At the point of challenge in that case,rate im p act o n A frican A e i s. At t e p i t o  c al n e i n t 3  e
15. Healy, supra note 12, at 94, (quoting David Schiller, Project Exile, available at
http://www.vahv.org/Exile).
16. Healy, supra note 12, at 95.
17. Richman, supra note 7, at 380-81.
18. Healy, supra note 12, at 111.
19. Richman, supra note 7, at 372, (citing Charlton Heston, Congressional Testi-
mony on Project Exile before the House Government Reform Subcomm. (Nov. 4, 1999)
http://www.nraila.org/news/19991104-CrimeControlJustice-002.html).
20. Healy, supra note 12, at 95.
21. Sarah Brady has been active in the gun control movement since the mid-1980s
after her husband, James Scott Brady, former White House Press Secretary for President
Ronald Reagan, sustained a permanently disabling head wound during an assassination
attempt on President Reagan's life on March 30, 1981. She is chair of the Brady Cam-
paign to Prevent Gun Violence and the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence. See
generally Brady Center to Prevent GunViolence website http://www.bradycenter.org.
22. Healy, supra note 12, at 94.
23. See United States v.Jones, 36 F Supp. 2d 304, 311 n.9 (E.D.Va. 1999) ("Project
Exile would be vulnerable on selective prosecution grounds if African American defen-
dants were routinely diverted from state to federal prosecution while prosecutors allowed
similarly situated Caucasian defendants to remain in state court.... [T]he Court takes this
opportunity to express its concern about the discretion afforded individuals who divert
cases from state to federal court for prosecution under Project Exile.... The inability of
[VOL. 12:305
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United States v.Jones, the parties stipulated that perhaps as many as ninety
percent of Project Exile defendants were African American.24 The district
court expressed concern as well about the "serious questions respecting
basic principles of federalism." 25 Constrained by equal protection and se-
lective prosecution case law, the court nevertheless denied defendant's
claim for relief.
The district court's reservations carried little impact and apparently
generated no pause outside the courtroom. Project Exile was heralded as a
success and became the footprint for Project Safe Neighborhoods.26 In
May 2001, President Bush expanded the program, unveiling Project Safe
Neighborhoods as a national initiative. The administration committed
more than $900 million for the project over the first three years.27 Initial
funding was used to hire 207 new assistant United States attorneys and
400 new ATF agents.28 These prosecutors would bring federal gun charges
for offenses that would normally be handled in state courts.29 The pro-
gram also aimed to promote gun prosecutions at the state and local levels.
The president's proposal dedicated an additional $75 million to hiring and
training approximately 600 full-time state and local prosecutors z° There
were to be other components to the program, including community out-
reach programs, but "Safe Neighborhoods' central goal [was] to raise the
number of firearm prosecutions in America." 31 From 2000-2005, federal
gun prosecutions nationwide increased by seventy-three percent.32 Ac-
cording to President Bush, "this Nation must enforce the gun laws which
exist on the books. 33
prosecutors to explain the procedure clearly is disquieting and casts some doubt on the
assertion that race places no role in deciding whether a particular case is to be federally
prosecuted.")
24. Id. at 311.
25. Id. at 313.
26. See Healy, supra note 12, at 110.
27. Remarks, supra note 4.
28. Id.
29. Healy, supra note 12, at 96.
30. Id.
31. Healy, supra at 96.
32. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Transcript of Attorney General Alberto R.
Gonzales' One-Year Anniversary Speech, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 2006). See also Project
Safe Neighborhoods: Executive Summary, http://www.psn.gov/about/execsumm.htnI.
33. Healy, supra note 12, at 96; see also Letter from President George W Bush to
United States Attorneys, (Nov. 27,2001) Letters to U.S. Attorneys from the President of
the United States, the Attorney General and the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms, Project Safe Neighborhoods Tool Kit http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
BIA/psngrants/psn-toolkit.pdf.
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But the Achilles' heel34 of Project Safe Neighborhoods is this: only a
select few of the "gun laws which exist on the books" have been enforced
and only in a select few of the communities across this Nation.
A. "hat Are the "Gun Laws Which Exist on the Books"
and How are They Being Enforced?
With rare exceptions, only two of twenty federal gun laws are en-
forced under Project Safe Neighborhoods. In 2003, eighty-seven percent
of all firearm-related cases brought by federal prosecutors involved only
two charges: under 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g), which prohibits those with a fel-
ony record from possessing a firearm ("felons-in-possession"); 3' and under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which enhances sentences for those caught with guns
"during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime." ' 6 Both of these laws are directed at the "end-users" of the firearm,
as opposed to the gun dealer, seller or intermediary who supplied the fire-
arm.
The other twenty major federal gun crimes-including gun traffick-
ing, corrupt gun dealers, stolen guns, selling to minors, obliterating serial
numbers, and lying on the background check form-are almost never
prosecuted.37 Prosecutions against gun suppliers continue to decline or
remain below 2000 levels. Even though more than 125,000 people were
found to have submitted false information on background check forms in
2003, only 532 cases were filed. In 2003, only thirty-two prosecutions
were brought against corrupt firearms dealers, a decline of eleven percent
since 2000. 38
This is so despite the fact that one of Project Safe Neighborhood's
purported goals is to target the sources of firearms. A January 2002
United States Attorney's Bulletin noted the goal of "heightened enforce-
ment of all federal laws against illegal gun traffickers, as well as corrupt
federal firearms licensees that supply them, with an emphasis on those
gun traffickers who supply illegal firearms to violent organizations and
juveniles."39 Attorney General John Ashcroft spoke about the need for a
34. No pun or reference to the previously-noted ATF operation intended.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) also prohibits from possessing a firearm: fugitives, unlawfil
drug users or addicts, those with mental defects, unlawful aliens, those discharged from the
Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions, those who have renounced their U.S. citi-
zenship, who is subject to a court restraining order or for those convicted of a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
36. 18 U.S.C.A § 824 (c)(1)(A).
37. Americans for Gun Safety Foundation, The Enforcement Gap: Federal Strategy Neglects
Sources of Crime Guns, at 2 (Oct. 2004) http://w3.agsfoundation.com /media/AGS-enfpdf
38. Id.
39. John A. Calhoun, Project Safe Neighborhoods: America's Network Against Gun Vio-
lence, 50 U.S. Atty's Bull. no.1 at 2(Jan. 2002).
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comprehensive strategy that focuses not just on street-level criminals. In a
speech given at a Project Safe Neighborhoods conference in 2004,
Ashcroft stated that:
[Project Safe Neighborhoods] is not just a prosecution pro-
gram-it is a comprehensive program. We are achieving our
goals of reducing illegal gun possession and abuse by not stop-
ping at merely prosecuting the gun-toting criminals. We are
cutting off the supply of illegal guns at the source by targeting
those who put these illegal guns out on the streets and into the
hands of criminals.40
Given that just over one percent of the federally licensed firearms
dealers ("FFLs") in America are linked to more than fifty-seven percent of
the guns recovered in crime and traced, 41 prosecuting gun suppliers would
seem logical. Corrupt gun dealers were, according to the Bureau of Alco-
hol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the source of 40,365 illegal
guns recovered during a two-year period in the late 1990s (32.1 percent
42
of all guns recovered during investigations).
But the numbers belie the claim that the program is comprehensive
in terms of the types of crimes charged. As noted, eighty-seven percent of
all firearm-related cases brought by federal prosecutors involved only two
charges. These two categories of cases both target street-level gun-toters
who may or may not have been engaged in violent or dangerous activ-
ity.43 For fiscal year 2003, only 4.2 percent of cases were brought for lying
on Firearm Purchase Form, 1.88 percent for Stolen Firearms, 1.5 percent
for Trafficking, 0.7 percent for Obliterated Serial Numbers, 0.3 percent
for Corrupt Firearms Dealers, and 0.2 percent for Supplying Firearms to
Minor or Near a School.
44
Criminal cases against corrupt gun dealers declined by eleven per-
cent between 2000 and 2004, and from 2000-2003, only 120 cases were
brought under the three federal statutes that deal with corrupt gun stores.
40. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the Project Safe
Neighborhoods National Conference, Kansas City, Mo. (June 16, 2004)
http://www.atf.gov/press/fy04press/062204ag-psn.htm.
41. Brian J. Siebel, Gun Industry Immunity: Why the Gun Industry's 'Dirty Little Secret'
Does Not Deserve Congressional Protection, 73 UMKC L. REv. 911 (2005).
42. Americans for Gun Safety Foundation, supra note 37, at 8 (citing Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Commerce in Firearms in the United States, at
25 (Feb. 2000)).
43. One of the criticisms of Project Exile was that the program targeted individuals
regardless of their propensity for violence. A federal judge in Richmond noted that
"Ninety percent of these [Exile] defendants are probably no danger to society." Healy,
supra note 12, at 106 (quoting Toni Heinzl, Richmond's Project Exile Criticized by Attorneys,
Federal Judge, Fort Worth Star- Telegram, Sept. 17, 2000, at 21).
44. Americans for Gun Safety Foundation, supra, note 36 at 11.
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During these four years, dealer prosecutions accounted for less than one
percent (.32 percent) of all federal gun prosecutions.5
Gun trafficking laws are rarely enforced even in those states known
for being the source of guns used in crime. In fiscal years 2000-2002,
federal prosecutors filed only 26 cases against gun traffickers in Georgia,
46
although that state was known in 2001 to be the leading supplier of guns
to criminals in Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, and Massachusetts, and was
among the top five crime gun suppliers to New Jersey, South Carolina,
Tennessee, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, Michigan, Pennsylvania,
Washington, D.C., and Maryland.47
In North Carolina, from 2000-2002, there were only 23 federal
prosecutions for illegal gun trafficking,48 though this state too is known to
be a leading supplier of crime guns. As of 2003, it was the second largest
supplier of guns used in crime in New York, and the fifth largest supplier
49
of handguns used in crime across the country. In 2000, 3,308 crime guns
were traced to sources in North Carolina, including 1,421 crime guns
used in other states. Of an estimated 22,000 firearms stolen in North
Carolina from 2000-2002, there were only 16 federal prosecutions for
stealing firearms.54
The problem of selective enforcement of the existing laws is exacer-
bated by the fact that almost every state has laws similar to the two federal
laws aimed at street-level criminals, while in many cases only the federal
government has the power to prosecute gun dealers. Federal prosecutors
choose to pursue those crimes that states have both the authority and re-
sources1 to prosecute, while virtually ignoring those criminals whom the
federal government alone can stop.
Every state except Vermont has prohibited felons from possessing
firearms and committing a felony with a firearm.-2 But only two states
have a law against the interstate trafficking of firearms, twenty-eight states
have no law against lying on the firearm purchase background check
form, thirty-three states do not require firearm dealers to obtain a state
license or register with state authorities, and only nine states have laws
that allow law enforcement to review inventory and sales records kept by
45. Id. at 17.
46. Americans for Gun Safety, The Iron Pipeline: Georgia is Nation's Second Lead-
ing Gun Trafficking State, at 1 (Aug. 2003), available at http://ww2.americansforgunsafety.
com/traffickingreport-georgia.pdf.
47. Id.
48. North Carolinians Against Gun Violence Education Fund, Shut-off the Iron
Pipeline: Stop Gun Trafficking, available at http://www.ncgv.org/trafficking.htm.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See discussion infra Part IV.
52. MILLER supra note 3, at 58.
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these dealers5 3 This means that in most states exclusive authority to prose-
cute violations of these gun laws lies with the federal government.
It is arguable that existing gun laws do not go far enough-that
more legislation is needed to control the flow of guns. But opponents of
gun control argue that the government should focus its law enforcement
efforts on those who use guns; that is, the problem is not with the guns,
but with those who use them unlawfully. These opponents have effec-
tively won the debate in terms of the national policy. Despite the
apparently neutral position that it should focus on enforcing "existing gun
laws," the federal government has chosen to turn a blind eye to violators
of most of those laws and singularly focuses on street-level gun-toters.
The laws are enforced against only a discrete category of criminals,
and against these individuals the government strikes hard. For cases re-
ferred under Project Safe Neighborhoods, federal prosecution is not
automatic. An assessment is often made to determine whether the penal-
ties are harsher under federal or state laws. The decision where to
prosecute is based in large part on where the penalty is harshest. As stated
by U.S. Attorney Debra WYang from the Central District of California,
the goal is "to ensure that these criminals receive the longest sentences
possible.
'5 4
B. Who are "These Criminals?"
The focus on street-level gun activity is coupled with a policy of
enforcing those laws in predominately African American communities.
Most United States Attorneys offices that implement the Project Safe
Neighborhoods program do so in cooperation with only a select few
communities within their districts. Despite claims to the contrary, most
United States Attorneys offices have far less than a comprehensive gun-
enforcement program (again, enforcing only two of twenty federal laws)
and additionally target communities in which African Americans are dis-
proportionately concentrated.55 That is, the program targets African
Americans by targeting the communities in which they live.
It is commonly known that America remains deeply divided by
race. 6 Citizens of most communities are well aware of those pockets
within their broader communities that are predominately African Ameri-
can. Thus, to focus geographically on any given community in America
53. Id.
54. YANG, supra note 5.
55. See discussion infra at page 12 and Appendices A and B.
56. Segregation remains high in many metropolitan areas, though it has generally
decreased across the country, with an average decline of 5.5 percentage points between
1990-2000. Segregation remains especially marked in the Midwest and Northeast. See
Edward L. Glaeser and Jacob L.Vigdor, Racial Segregation in the 2000 Census: Promising
News, The Brookings Institute Survey Series (April 2001).
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comes with requisite knowledge about the race of those citizens who will
be impacted. That is, a decision to prosecute in urban, minority commu-
nities will necessarily have a different racial impact than prosecuting in
predominantly White suburban and rural communities. A review of the
communities targeted by Project Safe Neighborhoods makes clear that for
most United States Attorneys' offices, the targeted communities are those
in which African Americans comprise the majority or are significantly
overrepresented in proportion to their representation in this country.
African Americans make up only 12.9 percent of the population in
the United States, 7 but more than half of all African Americans in the
United States, and sixty percent of African American urban dwellers, live
in thirty metropolitan areas.56 The thirty cities with the largest African
American populations are: Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleve-
land, Columbus, Detroit, Gary-Hammond-E. Chicago, Indiana,
Indianapolis, Kansas City, Los Angeles-Long Beach, Milwaukee, New
York, Newark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Francisco-Oakland,
Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Greensboro-Winston
Salem, Houston, Memphis, Miami, New Orleans, Norfolk-Virginia
Beach, Tampa-St. Petersburg, and Washington, D.C. 9 Project Safe
60Neighborhoods targets every single one of these communities.
Even amongst smaller communities, Project Safe Neighborhoods
targets those communities where African Americans are disproportion-
ately represented. Of the fifty-four cities with populations exceeding
100,000 where African Americans make up thirty percent or more of the
population, 61 Project Safe Neighborhoods focuses on at least fourty-four
of those communities.6 2 These communities are the primary, and often
63
even the exclusive, focus of Project Safe Neighborhoods' prosecutions.
Given that African Americans are disproportionately concentrated in
these communities, it should come as no surprise that African Americans
are disproportionately prosecuted under Project Safe Neighborhoods. It
has been argued in several districts that Project Safe Neighborhoods tar-
gets African Americans. The preliminary numbers gathered by these
districts are disturbing.
57. Jesse Mckinnon, The Black Population: 2000, U.S. Census Bureau (Aug. 2001)
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbrO1-5.pdf#search
58. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANcY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID-
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 62 (1993).
59. Id.
60. See Appendix A (outlining the targeted cities and references from Department of
Justice ("DOJ") materials reflecting the cities involved in the Project Safe Neighborhood's
project in each U.S. Attorney's office).
61. See Appendix B.
62. Id.
63. DOJ descriptions of Project Safe Neighborhoods efforts reflect that only certain
cities are focused upon, and also reference the Project Safe Neighborhoods "partners" as
the local law enforcement agencies in these cities. See Appendices A & B.
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According to statistics presented in the Eastern District of Michigan,
almost ninety percent of those prosecuted under Project Safe Neighbor-
hoods are African American.64 In the Southern District of New York
where Project Exile was implemented, there was testimony showing that
more than eighty percent of defendants prosecuted under the project
were African American. In the Southern District of Ohio, statistics have
shown that of seventy-seven cases known and reviewed under Project
Disarm (Cincinnati's Project Safe Neighborhood's initiative), seventy of
the defendants were African American, more than ninety percent of all
prosecutions under the program.6 And under Project Exile in Richmond,
Virginia, the defendant and prosecution stipulated in an Eastern District
case that "as many as 90 percent of the defendants prosecuted under Pro-
ject Exile are African American., 66
There is no question that defendants prosecuted under Project Safe
Neighborhoods are treated disparately. Cases are reviewed for federal or
state prosecution dependent on where the penalty is harsher. Alternatively,
the United States Department of Justice explicitly notes that "in some
jurisdictions, state prosecutors offer violent gun criminals the option of
receiving higher than usual state sentences in lieu of federal prosecution,
which may carry an even higher sentence. Under that approach, the pos-
sibility of severe federal sanctions can be used as an incentive for a
defendant to accept a strong state plea bargain.,
6
1
The upshot is simple: an individual caught in one of the targeted
communities will face harsher penalties than an individual caught in a
non-targeted community. Presumably, there exist outside of the targeted
areas similarly-situated individuals who are spared the "higher than usual"
penalties associated with Project Safe Neighborhoods. But such a pre-
sumption, however logical, is not alone grounds for a claim of
discriminatory enforcement.
II. COURTS HAVE APPLIED SELECTIVE PROSECUTION LAW TO GOVERN THE
INQUIRY IN PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS CASES
Because challenges under Project Safe Neighborhoods are raised by
criminal defendants who claim to have been singled out for differential
64. See United States v. Hubbard, Crim. No. 04-80321, 2006 WL 1374047, at 1
(E.D.Mich. May 17, 2006) (of the 61 federal prosecutions under Project Safe Neighbor-
hoods handled by the Federal Defender's Office, 54 were African American, two were
Native American, three were Hispanic or Latino, and two were Caucasian); see United
States v. Hubbard, Crim. No. 04-80321, 2006 WL 1374047, at 1 (E.D.Mich. May 17,
2006). See also United States v.Wallace, 389 F Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
65. Dan Horn, Bias Alleged in City Gun Cases: Police, Prosecutors Tougher On Blacks,
THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 7, 2003.
66. See United States v.Jones, 36 F Supp. 2d 304,307 (E.D.Va. 1999).
67. Project Safe Neighborhoods Tool Kit, supra note 33, at 2-17 (emphasis added).
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treatment in their prosecutions, courts have applied selective prosecution
case law. The strict tests that govern the review of selective prosecution
challenges make a successful claim nearly impossible. This next section
examines the development of selective prosecution case law, and ulti-
mately argues that the traditional tests for selective prosecution should not
apply in the context of programs such as Project Safe Neighborhoods
where the federal government knowingly targets minority communities.
A. The Standard of Review for a Selective Prosecution Claim
The Supreme Court has held that if an individual is singled out for
prosecution based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
some other arbitrary classification, the prosecution violates the right to
equal protection under the law.68 A defendant's right to equal protection
during federal prosecution is secured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.69 Courts have held, however, that a defendant's equal
protection claim that he was singled out on the basis of race for prosecu-
70tion is a claim for selective prosecution.
A claim of racially selective prosecution requires the same proofs
that are necessary to prove an equal protection claim. In a number of early
equal protection cases, where there was evidence that a policy or law dis-
proportionately impacted African Americans, circuit courts accepted this
as adequate proof that equal protection was not afforded.7 1 But in 1976
the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis7 2 that viable equal protec-
tion claims based on race must prove discriminatory purpose-actual
intent to discriminate-in addition to proof of a disproportionate impact.
The standards for proving an equal protection violation, requiring
proof of discriminatory impact and intent, were subsequently required in
selective prosecution cases by several appellate courts. 3 In United States v.
74Wayte, the Supreme Court explicitly required proof of strict intent in a
selective prosecution case, explaining that a selective prosecution claim is
based on equal protection standards, which "require [the] petitioner to
68. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456 (1962).
69. See United States v.Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
70. See Jones, 36 F Supp. 2d at 310 (a challenge to prosecutorial policy as race-based
is evaluated under selective prosecution law because "the tribunal in which prosecution
occurs depends upon the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.")
71. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 41 (Oct. 1998), (citing Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal
Process, 101 Hawv. L. R-v. 1472, 1536-39 (1988)).
72. 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
73. Davis, supra note 71, at 41-42 (citing Delaware v. Holloway, 460 A.2d 976, 978
(Del. Super. Ct. 1983)).
74. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
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show both that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory ef-




Selective prosecution claims are very difficult to prove, as there is
rarely proof that a prosecutor sought prosecution because of a defendant's
race. Moreover, the tests for proving discriminatory impact and purpose
are applied under a strenuous standard of review. Prosecutors have broad
discretion in making charging decisions and those decisions are rarely
disturbed. "The presumption of regularity supports ... prosecutorial deci-
sions and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume
that they have properly discharged their official duties. .76 In the ordi-
nary case, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the
accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or
not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury,
generally rests entirely in his discretion"'
77
Separation of powers principles command this high standard for
court-based challenges to prosecutorial discretion. The Supreme Court
has emphasized that a selective prosecution challenge is essentially a chal-
lenge to the decision-making authority of an agency within the Executive
Branch. A selective prosecution claim asks a court to exercise judicial
power over a "special province" of the Executive .7 Accordingly, the Court
has emphasized that "[t]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys
retain 'broad discretion' to enforce the Nation's criminal laws. .... They
have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President's
delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 'take
Care that the Laws be faithfully exercised.'.. .'79 In order to dispel the pre-
sumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection, a criminal
defendant must present "clear evidence to the contrary.,80
As noted, there have been challenges to Project Safe Neighbor-
hoods' prosecutions on the basis that African Americans are singled out
for prosecution in violation of their right to equal protection. The courts
in each instance have required proof of discriminatory impact and pur-
pose. The next two sections examine what is required for proving
discriminatory impact and purpose in selection prosecution cases. But
they also examine the purposes for these tests and why they should not
govern the inquiry as to whether the Project Safe Neighborhoods pro-
gram violates the guarantee of equal protection.
75. Id. at 608.
76. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (citing United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S.
1, 14-15 (1926)).
77. Id. at 464 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,364 (1978)).
78. Id. (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,832 (1985)).
79. Id., citing U.S. Const. art. II, § 3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 516, 547.
80. Id. at 465.
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B. Proof of Disparate Impact Requires Proof that there Were Others
"Similarly Situated" "ho Were Not Prosecuted
The first test for proving racially selective prosecution-
discriminatory impact-requires proof not only that members of defen-
dant's race were disproportionately affected by a prosecution policy, but a
defendant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race
were not prosecuted."' This requirement was first alluded to in the 1905
82Supreme Court case Ah Sin v. Wittman.
In that case, Ah Sin, a subject of China, petitioned a California State
court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that Chinese were singled out
for enforcement of a San Francisco County ordinance prohibiting gaming
tables in barricaded rooms. He argued that Chinese were singled out, but
offered no evidence that the practice was directed exclusively at Chinese,
"or that there were other offenders against the ordinance than the Chi-
nese as to whom it was not enforced" ' 3 Although the Court did not
explicitly require proof that there were non-Chinese similarly-situated,
subsequent courts interpreted the case to require such proof8 4 I will dis-
cuss in Part II.B.2 that this interpretation was perhaps too broad and
forecloses viable claims of equal protection under the Due Process Clause.
But I will first outline what courts have required to prove that others are
similarly-situated in Project Safe Neighborhoods cases, as well as in other
race-based challenges to prosecutorial decision-making.
Proving that there are others "similarly-situated" to the complaining
defendant is difficult. The Supreme Court has suggested otherwise, ob-
serving that "it should not [be] an insuperable task to prove that persons
of other races were being treated differently than [the complaining defen-
dants]. " 's In United States v. Hubbard, a recent Project Safe Neighborhoods
case, a defendant sought to buttress his claim that the program had a dis-
criminatory impact on African Americans with evidence that a non-
African American was similarly situated, but was not prosecuted. The
court held that the evidence was insufficient.
In Hubbard, Hubbard presented evidence that Project Safe
Neighborhoods disproportionately impacted African Americans. The evi-
dence that the program has a disproportionate impact on African
Americans was significant. In the Eastern District of Michigan, the Fed-
eral Defender's Office conducted a study reflecting that of 61 Project Safe
Neighborhoods' cases referred to its office, fifty-four defendants were Af-
rican American, two were Native American, three Hispanic and two were
81. Id.
82. 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
83. Id. at 507-08.
84. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 466.
85. Id. at 470.
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White.86 That is, eighty-nine percent of the defendants were African
American, and ninety-seven percent were non-White. 7 Hubbard pro-
duced additional evidence of a White defendant who was not prosecuted
in federal court.
8
Hubbard, who had a felony record, was federally prosecuted for pos-
sessing a firearm. He introduced into evidence a clipping from a
newspaper describing a non-African American who was arguably simi-
larly situated to him, but who was not prosecuted federally. The clipping
reflected the sentence of a defendant in a state court in Michigan with
the following description: Newman, Christopher Lee, 30, of 2614 S. St.
Anthony, Jackson. Possession of cocaine, with intent to deliver, less than
8950 grams; felon in possession of a firearm.
The court held that the article did not establish whether Newman
was similarly situated to Hubbard. The court noted that relevant factors
for determining similarity include "comparison, for example, of the
amounts of crack involved in cases with White defendants, their criminal
histories, propensity for violence, and any other facts that might justify the
higher sentences in they were prosecuted in federal court."90 Because
Hubbard had no evidence of Newman's criminal history, he had not car-
ried his burden of showing that he was similarly situated to Newman for
the purpose of obtaining discovery on the selective prosecution claim.91
Presumably it would be difficult for Hubbard to know the criminal
history of another defendant, but also relevant is that he could not ascer-
tain whether his criminal history was the basis for the prosecution
selecting his case for referral under Project Safe Neighborhoods. 92 With-
out knowing the basis on which he was selected for prosecution, Hubbard
was faced with the near-impossible task of identifying "similarly-situated"
individuals who were not selected for prosecution. Hubbard therefore
sought discovery on the guidelines used in selecting cases for prosecution
under Project Safe Neighborhoods.
Absent perfectly identical crimes by identical individuals, presuma-
bly every person can be distinguished on some basis. The Supreme Court
so much as acknowledged this near-impossibility in McCleskey v. Kemp,93 a
selective prosecution case in which defendant argued that the State of




90. Id. at 3 (citing United States v. Daniels, 142 F Supp. 2d 140, 144 (D. Mass.
2001)).
91. Id.
92. Hubbard's criminal history was as follows: one conviction for larceny over $100,
two convictions for felonious assault, and one conviction for carrying a concealed weapon.
Id.
93. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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Georgia discriminatorily selected African Americans for execution. The
Court noted: "[t]here are, in fact, no exact duplicates in capital crimes and
capital defendants. The type of research submitted [therein] tends to show
which of the directed factors were effective, but is of restricted use in
showing what undirected factors control the exercise of constitutionally
required discretion.'' 94
Absent some objective criteria, a defendant is almost fatally chal-
lenged to identify a person similarly situated to him. Therefore, as noted,
Hubbard requested discovery about the criteria prosecutors use in Project
Safe Neighborhoods' prosecutions. Applying a standard for discovery that
is practically as demanding as that for proving a substantive selective
prosecution claim, the district court denied Hubbard's request for discov-
ery.
1. Obtaining Discovery in a Selective Prosecution Case
It is necessary at this point to diverge to the issue of discovery in se-
lective prosecution cases to appreciate the challenge of ultimately proving
a selective prosecution claim. The Supreme Court set forth the standards
for obtaining discovery in selective prosecution cases in United States v.
Armstrong. In Armstrong the Court reviewed whether two defendants,
Armstrong and Hampton, were entitled to discovery on their claims that
the federal Government disproportionately prosecuted African Americans
under the federal crack cocaine laws. Defendants presented evidence that
all of 24 crack cocaine cases defended by the Federal Defenders Office in
the Central District of California involved African American defendants. 9
The district court ordered discovery.
96
In filing a motion for reconsideration, the Government submitted
affidavits and other evidence to explain why it had chosen to prosecute
defendants, and why the study showing that all defendants federally prose-
cuted were African American did not support an inference that the
Government was singling out African Americans for cocaine prosecution.
In addition to affidavit testimony from federal and local agents that race
played no role in their investigation, an Assistant United States Attorney
explained in an affidavit that the decision to prosecute met the general
criteria for prosecution and that defendants were involved in a "fairly sub-
stantial crack cocaine ring. ,7 The Government submitted sections of a
Drug Enforcement Agency report concluding that '1]arge-scale, interstate
94. Id. at 290.





trafficking networks controlled by Jamaicans, Haitians and Black street
gangs dominate the manufacture and distribution of crack cocaine."98
To rebut the suggestion that African Americans were disproportion-
ately engaged in this particular type of crime and thus the number of
prosecutions would necessarily be skewed against African American de-
fendants, the defendants countered with evidence that crack cocaine was
used and trafficked by both African Americans and Caucasians in the
Central District of California. They presented an affidavit from an intake
coordinator at a drug treatment center stating that there are "an equal
number of Caucasian users and dealers to minority users and dealers." 99
There was also affidavit testimony that an equal number of African
American and non-African Americans were prosecuted in state courts,
reflecting that similarly situated defendants exist, but were not being
prosecuted federally where the penalties were substantially more severe
than those under state law.1°°
The federal district court ordered discovery, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed, and an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit held that discovery
should be made. The Supreme Court held that defendants were not enti-
tled to discovery. Given the demanding standards for proving a claim of
selective prosecution, the Court held that there must likewise be a rigor-
ous standard for obtaining discovery in aid of such a claim.'0 ' The Court
held that there must be some evidence tending to show the existence of
the discriminatory effect element. '0 2 Specifically, defendants must make a
threshold showing that similarly situated defendants of other races could
have been prosecuted, but were not.103
In establishing a rigorous standard for discovery, the Supreme Court
did not discuss how such a standard might differ from that for proving the
selective prosecution claim. The Court noted that appellate courts have
described the necessary showing "with a variety of phrases" such as "col-
orable basis," "substantial and concrete basis," "substantial threshold
showing:' or "reasonable likelihood. '10 4 But the Court noted: "the many
labels for this showing conceal the degree of consensus about the evi-
dence necessary to meet it."The Court then noted:
In this case we consider what evidence constitutes "some evi-
dence tending to show the existence" of the discriminatory:
effect element. The Court of Appeals held that a defendant may




101. Id. at 468.
102. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 468.
103. Id. at 469.
104. Id. at 468.
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evidence that the Government has failed to prosecute others
who are similarly situated to the defendant .... We think it was
mistaken in this view. The vast majority of the Courts of Ap-
peals require the defendant to produce some evidence that
similarly situated defendants of other races could have been
prosecuted, but were not, and this requirement is consistent
with our equal protection clause.... As the three-judge panel
explained, "selective prosecution implies that a selection has
taken place."10'
The Court failed to explain precisely what "some evidence" or a "credible
showing" requires.
2. Proof of "Similarly-Situated" Others in
Project Safe Neighborhoods Cases
It is useful to examine the development of selective prosecution case
law and how the courts came to demand evidence of "similarly-situated"
persons in order to question its applicability to the Project Safe
Neighborhoods enforcement policy. I will start this analysis with the 1886
Supreme Court case Yick Wo v. Hopkins, °6 the first and only case to ever
successfully challenge a prosecution policy on the basis that it was racially
selective. 107
Yick Wo, a native of China, operated a laundry business in San Fran-
cisco. Although he had operated for twenty-two years, when he tried to
renew his license the board of fire wardens notified him that he was in
violation of a new city ordinance prohibiting laundries in wooden build-
ings. Yick Wo was fined, refused to pay the fine, and was arrested.'0 ' He
petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, ar-
guing that he had been "illegally deprived of his personal liberty."'1 9 The
case ultimately went to the United States Supreme Court. In striking
down the ordinance as discriminatory, the Supreme Court noted the fol-
lowing facts: 1) of 320 laundries in San Francisco 310 were housed in
wooden buildings 2) of 280 who applied for licenses from the fire warden,
all but one of the eighty non-Chinese received a license, even though
their laundries were in wooden structures, and all 200 Chinese applicants
were denied."0
105. Id. at 469.
106. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
107. Davis, supra note 71, at 44.
108. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 359.
109. Id. at 356-57.
110. Id. at 374.
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Twenty years later the Supreme Court decided the case Ah Sin v.
Wittman,"'Inoted above. In Ah Sin, the defendant argued that a San Fran-
cisco ordinance prohibiting gambling was enforced against Chinese and
not against any other races. There was no evidence to support this allega-
tion. The Court distinguished Yick Wo, wherein "it was shown that not
only the petitioner in that case, but two hundred of his countrymen, ap-
plied for licenses and were refused and that all the petitions of those not
Chinese, with one exception, were granted.""' 2 The Court rejected the
selective prosecution claim because "[t]here [was] no averment [by Ah
Sin] that the conditions and practices to which the ordinance was di-
rected did not exist exclusively among the Chinese, or that there were other
offenders against the ordinance than the Chinese as to whom it was not en-
forced."
113
The Ah Sin Court presented the issue squarely as "a matter of
proof."' 4 Evidence that the law was enforced against Chinese did not
necessarily mean that it was not enforced against non-Chinese. Thus, sub-
sequent courts have interpreted Ah Sin to require proof that there were
persons of a different race similarly-situated to defendant who were not
prosecuted.
But proof that others are similarly-situated should not be required in
cases such as those prosecuted under Project Safe Neighborhoods where
the government singularly targets a minority population for enforcement.
The relevant comparison is between those in targeted communities and
those who are not.
Given that Project Safe Neighborhoods operates within limited
geographic boundaries, one can infer that there are individuals not within
those boundaries who are "similarly-situated" to those prosecuted under
the program. This is a defensible inference. If federal prosecutors focus
exclusively or almost exclusively on minority communities the converse is
that prosecutors completely ignore potential claims in other communities.
Thus one can reasonably assume that there are others similarly-situated
who are not being prosecuted.
The Supreme Court has suggested that ordinarily one cannot make
this assumption. The Court noted in Armstrong that the "Court of Appeals
reached its decision [regarding disparate impact] in part because it started
'with the presumption that people of all races commit all types of
crimes-not with the premise that any type of crime is the exclusive
province of any particular racial or ethnic group."' The Supreme Court
rejected this presumption. Citing statistics on the number of convictions
111. 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
112. Id. at 507.
113. Id. at 507-08 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 508.
115. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469 (quoting U.S. v. Armstrong, 48 F3d 1508, 1516-17
(9th Cir. 1995)).
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in federal courts for crack cocaine (ninety percent of whom were Black),
LSD (93.4 percent of whom were White), and pornography or prostitu-
tion (ninety-one percent of whom were White), the Court interpreted
the data to reflect the level of criminal activity by members of those racial116
groups. However the data cited by the Court is nothing more than
proof as to who is being prosecuted, not who else might be subject to
prosecution. Such "proof" is especially deficient in response to claims that
the disparity exists because of unequal enforcement of particular laws.
With Project Safe Neighborhoods, the assumption that there are
others who could be but are not being prosecuted can and should be
made because prosecutors do not even purport to seek equal enforce-
ment. Instead prosecutors seek the harshest penalties available under
federal or state law within a finite target area. Thus, the discrimination
need not be proven by showing that similarly situated individuals exist
outside of the targeted communities. Rather, the discriminatory treatment
lies in the subjection of certain classes of citizens to federal scrutiny while
others are not subject to such scrutiny. This is, arguably, the proposition
for which Yick Wo stands.
Imagining a slight variation on the facts in Yick Wo is demonstrative.
Suppose that wooden structures were not in violation of the ordinance in
San Francisco if they contained equipment for putting out fires (the
1880's version of a fire extinguisher). Assume that most such structures
were commonly known not to have a fire extinguisher, but the fire war-
dens looked only at Chinese laundries and claimed ignorance about
whether non-Chinese laundries contained the extinguishers. Assume all
other facts are the same-that of 320 laundries in San Francisco, 310 were
housed in wooden buildings. Now suppose that the fire wardens in-
spected only Chinese laundries (with one exception) to determine
whether they were in compliance with the ordinance. As a result of the
limited inspections, of the 280 who applied for licenses from the fire war-
den, eighty non-Chinese received a license even though their laundries
were in wooden structures, while all 200 Chinese applicants were denied.
Would the outcome have been different? A review of the Court's analysis
suggests not.
The Court in Yick Wo noted that the ordinance "divide[d] the own-
ers or occupiers into two classes, not having respect to their personal
character and qualifications for the business, nor the situation and nature
and adaptation of the buildings themselves, but merely by an arbitrary
line, on one side of which are those who are permitted to pursue their
industry ... and on the other those from whom that consent is with-
held. . . ."' " The Court was impressed with the numbers reflecting that all
of those denied licenses were Chinese and all but one non-Chinese re-
116. Id. at 469-70.
117. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368.
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ceived licenses. But the numbers were persuasive not because Yick Wo
was able to show that the eighty non-Chinese applicants were "similarly
situated." Rather, the Court's concern was that the Chinese applicants
were treated differently as a distinct class of citizens.
Under the hypothetical, it would have been impossible forYick Wo
to prove that the non-Chinese applicants were similarly situated because
the fire extinguishers would not have been visible, thusYickWo could not
have proven that these operators were similarly situated to him. But given
its express concern with an arbitrary line with clear racial implications,
one cannot imagine the outcome of that case being different had the ad-
ministrators claimed ignorance as to whether the non-Chinese applicants
were exempt from the ordinance. Where there is such discriminatory fo-
cus in the inquiry-the exclusive subjection of a distinct class of citizens
to scrutiny-defendants should not have to show that there were others
similarly situated who could have been but were not prosecuted.
This interpretation of Yick Wo does not unreasonably broaden its
holding. The data in that case strongly suggested differential treatment of
Chinese applicants. This interpretation does suggest that Yick Wo was not
intended to apply so narrowly as to create an impossibility-requiring
proof not only that the officials acted differently in focusing on Chinese
applicants for inspection, but that there were non-Chinese applicants who
could have been but were not inspected (i.e., were similarly-situated).The
current test would have required Yick Wo to show that the fire extin-
guishers were not in the laundries of non-Chinese who were not
prosecuted, a near impossibility.
If there is evidence that communities are highly segregated then
bringing a case in some but not all districts will have the effect of bring-
ing cases against only African Americans, which should constitute
adequate proof of disparate impact." 8 There should be no requirement of
proof that there are similarly situated defendants where the standard for
prosecutorial selection does not involve looking for other defendants. The
discriminatory treatment is the consideration for harsh penalties against
those in African American communities, and the failure to consider pen-
alties against those in other communities. But is it also enough to prove
the second requirement for a selective prosecution challenge-
discriminatory intent?
C. Proof of Discriminatory Intent
Even in those cases where discriminatory impact has been shown,
courts have also required proof of discriminatory intent. The Supreme
118. Ultimately it is my position that the disparate impact test should not govern at
all, but that the Project Safe Neighborhoods program should be reviewed as one involving
an impermissible race-based classification.
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Court has narrowly defined what intent in this context means. According
to the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, intent requires more than awareness of
consequences. "It implies that the decisionmaker [sic]... selected or reaf-
firmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."' 9
In McCleskey, the defendant presented evidence from a statistical
study (the "Baldus study") showing that Blacks were more likely than
Whites to be executed in the State of Georgia, particularly when the vic-
tim was White. Prosecutors were substantially more likely to seek the
death penalty against Black defendants involving White victims, having
done so in seventy percent of the cases versus thirty-two percent of the
cases involving White defendants and White victims. Prosecutors sought
the death penalty in fifteen percent of the cases involving Black defen-
dants and Black victims, and in nineteen percent of the cases involving
White defendants and Black victims. Notwithstanding this evidence that
race was a factor in prosecutors' decisions to seek the death penalty, the
Court deemed the evidence insufficient to prove that Georgia state prose-
cutors acted with a discriminatory purpose.
The Court rejected McCleskey's claim for several reasons. First, the
study did not prove that the decision makers discriminated in
McCleskey's particular case. 120 "He offer[ed] no evidence specific to his
own case that would support an inference that racial considerations played
a part in his sentence."' 121 Second, the Court questioned whether the con-
clusion could be drawn from the statistics that race was a factor in any
given capital case, and expressed concern that prosecutors did not have an
opportunity to explain the statistical disparity.22 Finally, the statistical evi-
dence was simply insufficient proof of discriminatory purpose. The Court
noted that "absent far stronger proof, it is unnecessary to seek such a re-
buttal [from prosecutors to the statistics], because a legitimate and
unchallenged explanation for the decision is apparent from the record:
McCleskey committed an act for which the United States Constitution
and Georgia laws permit imposition of the death penalty.' 1 23 The Court
"would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the
discretion [of prosecutors] has been abused."' '24
Race-based challenges to Project Safe Neighborhoods prosecutions
have generally failed in efforts to meet the McCleskey intent standard.
In the Project Exile Jones case, as to intent to discriminate, the court
found that fairly strong evidence suggesting discriminatory intent was
119. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (quoting Pers, Admir. of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256,279 (1979)).
120. Id. at 292.
121. Id. at 292-93.
122. Id. at 294-296.
123. Id. at 296-97.
124. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279.
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insufficient. In Jones, Chad Ramon Jones, an African American, alleged
that Project Exile was racially discriminatory because it targeted African
Americans for prosecution and also allegedly attempted to avoid more
diverse jury pools. The defense and prosecution stipulated that as many as
ninety percent of defendants prosecuted under Project Exile were African
American."5
Jones was initially charged in state court after police officers found a
nine-millimeter pistol in his vehicle, along with marijuana and drug para-
phernalia. Jones had been driving in the City of Richmond with two
passengers in his vehicle when a Richmond deputy sheriff observed Jones
driving in the wrong direction on a one-way street. The officer stopped
Jones.1 6 During the stop, the police officer determined that Jones' driver's
license was suspended.
Jones' felon-in-possession case was dismissed in state court and
charges were brought in federal court. In addition to arguing selective
prosecution, Jones alleged that his case was moved to federal court to
avoid a Richmond jury. If Jones' state case had proceeded in the City of
Richmond, he would have drawn jurors from a pool made up of ap-
proximately seventy-five percent African Americans. A jury pool for the
federal district in the Eastern District of Virginia was approximately ten
percent African American. Jones alleged that the charges in federal court
were based in part on the efforts by prosecutors to avoid an African
American jury. As proof, he offered evidence of statements by an Assistant
United States Attorney from the Eastern District ofVirginia "that one [of
the] goal[s] of Project Exile was to avoid 'Richmond juries' .
However, the court concluded that the only evidence suggesting ra-
cial animus-the federal prosecutor's statement about "Richmond
juries"-could be interpreted in more than one way and "given a less
nefarious construction.' 128 The court said that the comment could have
simply meant that a Richmond jury would be bound by state law, or "en-
dowed ... with the ability to recommend a term of imprisonment above
which a judge may not sentence a defendant.' 12 9 The court went on to say
that "[c]onsidering that '[n]o latitude of intention should be indulged in a
case like this,' ... and taking into account the presumption of regularity
afforded prosecutorial discretion, the Court is unwilling to ascribe an un-
constitutional intent to those responsible for Project Exile absent clear
evidence of a racially discriminatory intent.'" Accordingly, the statement
125. Jones, 36 F Supp. 2d at 307.
126. The facts as outlined in the case do not state why Jones was stopped.
127. Jones, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (quoting U.S. v. Scates, No. 3:98CR87, sentencing
transcript at 36-37 (E.D.Va. Nov. 24, 1998)).
128. Id. at 313.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 466 (quoting Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. at
508)).
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by the assistant U.S. Attorney was deemed insufficient to prove discrimi-
natory intent. Such has been the fate of subsequent challenges to Project
Exile and its progeny, Project Safe Neighborhoods.
Shortly after Jones was decided, the Western District of New York is-
sued an opinion addressing a claim that Project Exile as enforced in
Rochester, New York, was discriminatory. In United States v. Grimes, the
court held that Grimes' evidence showing that twenty seven out of thirty
three defendants prosecuted under Project Exile were African American
failed to state a claim for selective prosecution. The court cited Grimes'
lack of evidence that there were White defendants similarly situated who
were not prosecuted, and noted that there was no showing of discrimina-
tory intent. Under a separate disparate impact analysis, the court
considered Grimes' claim that the geographic focus on the City of Roch-
ester by the Western District of New York, in effect targeted African
Americans. Without concluding as to whether Grimes showed a disparate
impact, the court rejected Grimes' claim because there was no evidence
of racial animus or disparate treatment.1
2
More recently, the several prosecutions under Project Safe
Neighborhoods in the Eastern District of Michigan have withstood chal-
lenges on equal protection grounds. 133 In March 2006, the Sixth Circuit
rejected a challenge to Project Safe Neighborhoods on equal protection
grounds in the case United States v. Henderson.13
Henderson was charged in federal court under Project Safe
Neighborhoods. He argued that his prosecution under the program was
unconstitutionally race-based because prosecutors target minorities by
focusing on a geographic location with a high minority population. Al-
though not specifically referred to by the court in the Henderson
decision, as noted, evidence has been presented in numerous cases in the
Eastern District of Michigan that eighty-nine percent of the prosecutions
in that district were against African Americans.135 Nevertheless, in dicta,
the Sixth Circuit noted that because there was "no record evidence that
would tend to show either discriminatory intent or effect on the part of
131. United States v. Grimes, 67 E Supp. 2d 170 (WD.N.Y 1999).
132. Id. at 173.
133., See United States v. Culbertson, Crim. No. 05-80058 2006 WL 1556203 (E.D.
Mich. June 1, 2006); Hubbard v. United States, supra note 86; United States v. Beard, No.
05-50026 2005 WL 3262545, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2005); and United States v.Wal-
lace, supra note 64. There has been at least one case filed in the Western District of
Michigan, as well. See Carroll v. United States, No. 1:04-CR-244, 2006 WL 1459838, at
*1 (WD. Mich. May 24,2006).
134. See United States v. Henderson, No. 05-1546 2006,WL 890688, at *1-2 (6th
Cir. Mar. 30, 2006).
135.: Id. at 3.
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the government's prosecution of Henderson, '' 136 Henderson had failed to
state a claim for selective prosecution.
According to the Court, a selective prosecution claim cannot be
supported by proof short of evidence that prosecutors intended to dis-
criminate. Yet, this is difficult to prove; it is impossible to get into the
heads of prosecutors and show bad intent.
What may be shown, however, is that prosecutors knowingly act
with an uneven hand. In Yick Wo the Court noted that the administrators
acting against Yick Wo acted with "an evil eye and an uneven hand., 137
Subsequent courts have assumed that the "evil eye" is as necessary as the
"uneven hand" in proving discrimination. Should equal protection require
such? To consider this question, it is necessary to examine the possible
goals of equal protection laws.
III. APPLYING TRADITIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARDS TO
PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS PROSECUTIONS
There is a longstanding and rich debate about what equal protection
should be. There are those, such as Kenneth L. Karst and Ronald
Dworkin, who argue that equal protection guarantees to each individual
the same rights as other members of the community-rights to be treatedS 138
as respected, responsible and participating members of society,3 and with
the same concern and respect from their government as the more power-
ful members have secured for themselves. 3 9 There are those such as Cass
R. Sunstein, who read the equal protection clause "to prohibit unprinci-





And there are those who argue process theory, most fully articulated
in the writings of Paul Brest and John Hart Ely."1 Under this view, the
purpose of equal protection law is to correct for the danger that the ma-
jority, because it cares less about a minority's welfare than about its own,
will award members of the minority fewer benefits, or impose on them
disproportionate burdens. 142
This latter view has shaped much of the equal protection debate
over the past two decades, and reflects, at a minimum, a kind of "lowest
136. Id.
137. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
138. See Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARv. L. REv. 1,4 (1977).
139. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198-99 (1977).
140. See Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127,128.
141. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135-79 (1980); and Paul Brest,
Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2 (1976).
142. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283,
1299 (1995).
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common denominator" of approaches to equal protection: "pretty much
everyone agrees that equal protection should guard against prejudiced
decisions to disadvantage members of'discrete and insular minorities' ,14
Further expounding on this view, David A. Sklansky has applied the
"lowest-common-denominator" process theory to suggest that the federal
crack sentences "look pretty troubling.' ' 44 The theory suggests that the
objectively indefensible harsher sentences for crack cocaine are unfair and
impact African Americans disproportionately. Yet, the idea behind process
theory is "that majorities generally can and should be trusted to pass fair
laws, or laws that are fair enough, [and] ... the grounds for that trust be-
gin to evaporate in certain circumstances, including when the majority
enacts laws that impose a disproportionate share of the burdens on mem-
bers of a 'discrete and insular minority'. The problem is especially acute
when a law imposes virtually all of its burdens on such a minority.'
14
Sklansky noted the concern that "[w]hen faced with such a law, courts
need to worry that the majority may not have treated members of the
minority with equal concern and respect, and that if an appreciable share
of the law's burdens fell on members of the majority, the law would never
have been enacted or would subsequently have been amended or re-
pealed.'
46
The implementation of Project Safe Neighborhoods in minority
communities presents precisely this dilemma. Those in African American
communities-African Americans-are treated unfairly and with an un-
even hand. While racial animus may be nearly impossible to prove, what
may be inferred from objective facts is that prosecutors under Project Safe
Neighborhoods exact penalties without regard to the harm that comes
from treating members of the African American community more harshly
than members of other communities will be treated. The harm is the
treatment of African Americans as dispensable-jailing African Americans
disproportionately and for disproportionately longer periods of time. This
is the quintessential case of the majority enacting laws that impose a dis-
proportionate share of the burdens on members of a "discrete and insular
minority."
With a program like Project Safe Neighborhoods that specifically
targets minority communities, proof of discriminatory purpose is the
same as that for impact-that African American communities are not dis-
proportionately impacted incidentally or because they happen to commit
more gun crimes, they are impacted disproportionately because they are
singled out for differential treatment.
143. Id.





A. Equal Protection Laws Should Protect Against Differential Treatment
of Minority Communities.
Project Safe Neighborhoods involves differential patterns of en-
forcement with foreseeable discriminatory effects. This fact distinguishes
Project Safe Neighborhoods cases from cases with statistical evidence of
discriminatory impact.
The Supreme Court has generally rejected statistical evidence to
show discriminatory intent, but the fundamental problem in those cases
was determining whether the evidence proved that the disparity was
based on race.
In McCleskey, the Court held that the Baldus study focusing on dis-
criminatory application of the death penalty in Georgia was "clearly
insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers [sic] in
McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory purpose"1 47 The underlying
problem was that the Court did not find the statistical study to be persua-
sive evidence of discriminatory purpose. The Court found that the study
established "[a]t most ... a discrepancy that appears to correlate with
race," 4" but the Court declined "to assume that what is unexplained is
invidious."
1 49
The Court did not explore what else might explain the discrepancy
that "apparently" correlated with race. One possible explanation is that
the Court considered the possibility that the statistical variance was inci-
dental or explainable on non-racial grounds, much like the Court
suggested in Armstrong. As noted above, in rejecting the evidence showing
that ninety percent of crack cocaine defendants were African American,
the Court in Armstrong offered the explanation that perhaps that particular
criminal activity was more commonly engaged in by African Americans.
Questioning "the presumption that people of all races commit all types of
crime' the Court offered its own statistics from the Sentencing Commis-
sion to reflect who engaged in particular types of crimes.50
In Project Safe Neighborhoods cases, one need not infer from the
statistical evidence that African Americans are singled out because of their
race. The program narrowly focuses on African American communities.
The differential treatment of those in African American communities
foreseeably results in differential treatment of African Americans. Given
the foreseeable racial impact, geography in this context should be treated
147. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279.
148. Id. at 312.
149. Id. at 313.
150. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 469-70. As noted above, the Court reported the number
of convictions in federal courts for crack cocaine (ninety percent of whom were Black),
LSD (93.4 percent of whom were White), and pornography or prostitution (ninety-one
percent of whom were White), interpreting the data to reflect the level of criminal activity
by members of those racial groups.
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as an unlawful arbitrary classification."' The Supreme Court has left open
the possibility of prohibiting classifications other than overt racial classifi-
cations where such classifications are arbitrarily defined and have racial
implications.
B. Geography as an Impermissible "Arbitrary" Classification
in Prosecutorial Decision-Making
In considering the bounds for equal protection analysis, the Su-
preme Court in Oyler v. Boles s2 reviewed a case in which the defendant
challenged West Virginia's habitual offender laws. In that case, William
Oyler and Paul Crabtree each faced mandatory life sentences because
they had been previously convicted of at least three crimes punishable by
"confinement in a penitentiary-" Defendants argued that not all defen-
dants meeting that criteria were subject to the habitual offender law, and
thus they were denied equal protection in that they were punished more
harshly than others.
In rejecting defendants' claims, the Court noted that some selectivity
in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.The Court
rejected defendants' claims because there was no "deliberate policy of pro-
ceeding only in a certain class of cases.' ' 3 It specifically noted that there
was nothing showing "that the selection was deliberately based upon an
unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classifica-
tion.'0' 4 One would assume, then, that if a case were deliberately based on
such standards the Court would have found it to be violative of equal
protection. But short of an explicit racial classification, are courts forced
to examine the case for "disparate impact," or is it justifiable to examine
classifications other than race where the grouping has the effect of a racial
classification?
151. In a recent opinion, the Sixth Circuit implicitly rejected this argument. It was
argued in that case that Project Safe Neighborhoods' enforcement operation constitutes
racial discrimination if it is foreseeable that because of the ethnic composition of the
community one race will necessarily provide most of the government's targets. Citing the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Turner, 104 E3d. 1180 (9th Cir. 1997), the Sixth
Circuit noted the hypothetical has a "superficial attraction" but is flawed because it is pos-
sible that a particular kind of crime may come into vogue and be a feature of a
neighborhood or of an occupation marked by one or another ethnic or racial characteris-
tic. See United States v. Thorpe, 471 E3d. 652, 663-64 (6th Cir. 2006). This argument
presupposes that a particular crime is characteristic of a particular community without any
evidence whatsoever that such is the case. It prohibits consideration of the justifications for
differential treatment by summarily dismissing the discrimination claim on the basis that
there might be reasons for the differential treatment.
152. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).




In both Yick Wo and Ah Sin, the underlying question was whether
there was proof that Chinese were singled out for selective enforcement.
Subsequent cases applying the "similarly-situated" test have done so with-
out regard to whether there was proof that a particular class of citizens
was singled out for disparate treatment.With proof short of an overt racial
classification, defendants have had to meet the standards of a selective
prosecution claim, which requires proof of disparate impact and discrirmi-
natory intenz. But given the demographics in this country it is
conceivable that a geographic classification is tantamount to a racial classi-
fication.
The Supreme Court long ago recognized that geographic line-
drawing can be tantamount to racial-line drawing so as to violate equal
protection. In the 1879 case, Missouri v. Lewis,"' the Supreme Court con-
sidered Lewis' claim that he was denied equal protection as a citizen in
one of only a few counties in Missouri that did not allow its citizens the
right to appeal cases in which the amount in dispute was less than $2,500.
Although citizens of other counties had the right to appeal, the Court
denied Lewis relief because equal protection "does not secure to all per-
sons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same
remedies."1 6 However, the Court noted:
It is not impossible that a distinct territorial establishment and
jurisdiction might be intended as, or might have the effect of, a
discrimination against a particular race or class, where such
race or class should happen to be the principal occupants of
the disfavored district. Should such a case ever arise, it will be
time enough then to consider it.11
7
Such cases have since arisen, specifically those involving allegations
of unlawful gerrymandering, "8 and the Supreme Court continues to rec-
ognize the impact that geographic line drawing can have on racial
minorities in gerrymandering cases.' 9 In the recent case League of United
Latin American Citizens v. Perry,16 the Court reiterated and applied the tests
in gerrymandering cases, which acknowledge that geographic line-
drawing can knowingly affect a racial minority.The Supreme Court iden-
tified three threshold conditions for establishing a Voting Rights Act
violation, the first of which is that: "(1) the racial group is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
155. 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
156. Id. at 31.
157. Id. at 32.
158. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
159. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
160. Id.
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single-member district"' 6 ' That there are large and geographically com-
pact minority communities is a reality that should be considered in
selective prosecution cases as well.
In the Project Exile case United v.Jones, the district court in a selec-
tive prosecution challenge did recognize the reality that distinct
geographical boundaries might have the effect of"a discrimination against
a particular race."The court noted:
Prosecutors have implemented Project Exile in Richmond and
Norfolk. Both areas are urban and the population of each is
substantially African American. In these areas, federal firearms
statutes are aggressively enforced. The same statutes, however,
are rarely enforced in more rural areas of the Eastern District
of Virginia. This geographic variance means that defendants
charged with firearms offenses in outlying areas of the Eastern
District ofVirginia, who are more likely to be Caucasian, evade
federal prosecution under identical and equally applicable stat-
utes for identical conduct.
162
Coupled with evidence that approximately 90 percent of the Project Ex-
ile defendants were African American, the court held that "there is little
doubt that Project Exile has a disparate impact on African American de-
fendants.',
163
Project Safe Neighborhoods was implemented across the nation us-
ing, in most cases, the same geographic focus on urban communities to
the exclusion of suburban and rural communities. As noted above, many
of those communities had demographics similar to those in Richmond,
with a disproportionate concentration of African Americans in the tar-
geted communities.16
If one acknowledges, as the Supreme Court has in the gerryman-
dering context, that in America there remain "sufficiently large and
geographically compact" communities such that a racial minority group
constitutes a majority within those communities, then one must also ac-
knowledge that a "distinct territorial establishment and jurisdiction might
be intended as, or might have the effect of, a discrimination against a par-
ticular race or class, where such race or class should happen to be the
principal occupants of the disfavored district."'6 5 One can say not only
that Project Safe Neighborhoods in some districts targets particular com-
munities, but that it targets African American communities in particular.
161. Id. at 2614 (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1006-1007 (1994)).
162. Jones, 36 F Supp. 2d at 312.
163. Id.
164. See discussion, supra Part I.
165. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. at 32.
[VOL. 12:305
Separate and Unequal
Prosecutors in Project Safe Neighborhoods cases know the make-up
of their communities and that they are effectively targeting African
Americans in targeting certain communities. These cases do not suffer for
lack of proof that the disparities are more than fortuitous or based on be-
havior patterns. Whether there might remain disparities with non-targeted
enforcement, some disparity necessarily exists because prosecutors target
African American communities and do not target other communities.
This fact alone distinguishes Project Safe Neighborhoods cases from those
in which the Court questioned whether one could deduce from the sta-
tistical evidence that differential treatment was race-based.
Courts examining Project Safe Neighborhoods and its predecessor
projects have applied the two-part test under selective prosecution case
law. In doing so, the courts have failed to consider that the program oper-
ates with blatant discriminatory treatment--selective enforcement of the
law based on geographic parameters that are tantamount to racial line-
drawing.
To conclude that geographic classifications are tantamount to racial
classifications, findings would have to be made by a court, of course, in
any given district that there are "geographically compact" communities
that have a racial identity, and that prosecutors are in fact targeting certain
communities. This Article will proceed on the ambitious premise that
geographic line-drawing can, under certain circumstances, be considered
tantamount to racial line-drawing, and constitute a constitutionally-
impermissible classification.
C. The Project Safe Neighborhoods Program Should Be
Subject to a Strict Scrutiny Analysis.
The Supreme Court has made clear: "Whenever the government
treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suf-
fered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. 1 6 6 Persons need not offer
proof of strict intent where the claim is based on the denial of equal pro-
tection by the government's unequal treatment. According to the
Supreme Court in Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 1 6 1[a] racial classification, re-
gardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be
• - • ,,168
upheld only upon an extraordinary justification. If prosecutions are
166. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,229-30 (1995).
167. 442 U.S. 256,272 (1979).
168. Id. (citing Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 (1964)). Executive classifications based upon race are subject to
the same constitutional constraints as those promulgated by legislatures. Cf Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (military order excluding all persons of Japanese ances-
try from designated West Coast areas); and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)
(West Coast curfew on persons ofJapanese ancestry).
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based on a racial classification, then they must withstand a strict scrutiny
analysis; the program must be narrowly tailored and serve a compelling
state interest. 169
To determine whether the government has a compelling interest
justifying racial classifications, the Court requires inquiry into the justifi-
cations for the program. The Court said in Grutter v. Bollinger that:
"[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for ... race-based
measures" we have no way to determine what 'classifications are "benign"
or "remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics" 70 The Court also
made clear that it "appl[ies] strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to
'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [the government] is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool"'71 Whatever the purpose for the program, it must be narrowly tai-
lored to accomplish that purpose.
72
A strict scrutiny analysis of the Project Safe Neighborhoods pro-
gram requires conjecture about why Project Safe Neighborhoods operates
by enforcing select laws in select communities. The federal government
should be compelled under an equal protection challenge to provide in-
formation through discovery about the program to enable a fuller analysis.
Notwithstanding that, I will attempt an analysis based on the assumption
that the major justification for the Project Safe Neighborhood's limited
operation is that the targeted communities are those with high levels of
crime.
There may be some governmental interest in galvanizing resources
and striking hard against criminals in communities suffering from high
crime. But whether such goals are compelling is a more difficult question.
The use of geographic criteria does little more than make identification
of cases fairly easy. The Project Safe Neighborhoods prosecution policy is
largely reactive and little investigation is needed. As street-level gun-toters
are picked up, the cases are examined for federal or state prosecution. It is
therefore an easily satisfied, high-numbers operation. The justification
boils down to one of efficiency.
While broad sweeps may be efficient, efficiency in exchange for
equal protection is, to say the very least, hardly compelling. Geographic
and race-neutral criteria should enable the federal government to identify
individuals who pose a danger to society. Even-enforcement using objec-
tive criteria may require more than reactive efforts-finding and
prosecuting offenders besides those referred by participating local law en-
169. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)("[AIII racial classifications
imposed by [the] government 'must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scru-
tiny.'" (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 228).
170. Id. (quoting Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989)).




forcement agencies-but it is the obligation of the federal government to
ensure that its limited partnerships do not effectively eliminate considera-
tion of criminal activity that rightfully should be prosecuted federally.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Project Safe Neighborhoods' policy is
permissible as serving a compelling interest, the government "is still con-
strained in how it may pursue that end."173 Given the racial implications of
the targeted enforcement, whether a community-wide focus is narrowly
tailored is doubtful. Again, broad sweeps may be efficient, but undoubt-
edly come at the cost of individual consideration. Whether any particular
individual should be subject to the harshest penalties possible should be
determined based on individual characteristics, not based on where one
lives. Moreover, as discussed more fully in the next section, there can and
should be neutral criteria for federal enforcement that also make en-
forcement fairer and more efficient.
IV.WHY PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AS IMPLEMENTED
MAKES BAD POLICY
The question of the constitutionality of Project Safe Neighbor-
hoods' prosecution policy aside, a question that we also should ask is-is it
right? The practice of prosecutors' forum shopping for the harshest sen-
tences against a minority class of citizens contravenes a number of policies
in our criminal justice system. To begin, federal prosecutors have far-
reaching and broad authority. To ignore its obligations to evenly enforce
the laws has negative implications in the communities that are targeted, as
well as in the communities where crime is ignored.
"Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all respects, is espe-
cially pernicious in the administration of justice."' 74 Prosecutors should
seek justice in the broadest sense. It is antithetical to prosecutors' duties as
agents for the people to knowingly discriminate in prosecutions.
A prosecutor has substantial power.17 1 In the Supreme Court case of
Morrison v. Olsen,176 in which the Court reviewed the discretion of Inde-
pendent Counsel Kenneth Starr, Justice Scalia noted the words of Justice
Robert Jackson when he was Attorney General under President Franklin
Roosevelt:
173. Id. at 333 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,908 (1996)).
174. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 346 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell,
433 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).
175. In addition to the broad discretion given prosecutors by law, prosecutors also
have vast discretion by virtue of their not having to answer to a "client." Such freedom
creates the inherent risk that prejudice or self-interest will govern their decision-making.
See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 58-59 (1991).
176. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988).
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There is a most important reason why the prosecutor should
have, as nearly as possible a detached and impartial view of all
groups in his community. Law enforcement is not automatic. It
isn't blind. One of the greatest difficulties of the decision of
prosecutor is that he must pick his cases, because no prosecutor
can investigate all of the cases in which he receives com-
plaints. .. . "4hat every prosecutor is practically required to do is to
select the cases for prosecution and to select those in which the offense
is the most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof the
most certain.
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that
he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous
power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he
thinks he should get, rather than cases that need to be prose-
cuted. 
177
The prosecutor is not an ordinary advocate whose sole aim is to
win. Rather, the prosecutor serves the dual role of advocate for the gov-
ernment and administrator of justice. 7 8 As such, the prosecutor's duties
include the oversight function of insuring the fairness and efficiency of
the criminal justice system.179 "The United States Attorney is the repre-
sentative not of an ordinary party in a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all" 180
Forum-shopping by prosecutors for the harshest penalties by law is
not per se unlawful, 8" but to do so singularly against minority communi-
ties is an egregious violation of prosecutors' duty to seek justice.
Additionally, forum shopping is an effort to circumvent federal sentencing
177. Id. at 727-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing R. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor,
Address Delivered at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, April 1,
1940) (emphasis added).
178. See, e.g., Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 ("The responsibil-
ity of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice,
not merely to convict."); Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. (1991); Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.1(b) (Am. Bar Ass'n. 2d ed. 1980).
179. Davis, supra at 51 (citing Fred c. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial
Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 57 (1991)(citing Carol a.
Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 537, 538-39 (1986)).
180. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
181. But see Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of the Criminal
Law: The Need for Meaningful Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1313




policies that seek to eradicate considerations such as geography and
182
race.
One of the major principles underlying enactment of the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act ("SRA") is that similarly-situated defendants should be
sentenced uniformly. Congress commissioned the Sentencing Commis-
sion to provide "certainty" and "fairness" in sentencing, two of the
hallmarks of due process.'83 The Sentencing Commission was specifically
charged with "avoid[ing] unwarranted sentencing disparities among de-
fendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct...., 84 Congress was concerned with a history in sen-
tencing that meted out unwarranted disparities for similarly-situated
defendants based on such "illegitimate considerations as geography, race,
gender, socio-economic status, and judicial philosophy.'1 8 1
182. There are particular concerns when prosecutors forum shop between federal
and state systems. See Id. at 1326.
183. See Sandra D.Jordan, Have We Come Full Circle?Judicial Sentencing Discretion Re-
vived in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEpP. L. R.Ev. 615,617 (2006).
184. Id. at 622 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(b) (2000)).
185. Id. (emphasis added).The eradication of discrimination in sentencing was a ma-
jor policy underlying the new guidelines following a history that fluctuated from
determinative sentencing under English colonial practice to indeterminate sentencing, and
back with passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to determinate sentencing. The
history leading to the SRA is instructive.
During the period in United States history of indeterminate sentencing, state and
federal judges were empowered with the authority to impose any sentence they chose
within a wide penalty range established by the legislature. Indeterminate sentencing came
in response to criticism that fixed sentences did not allow for individuation of punishment,
and the belief that death and corporal punishment were disproportionate penalties with
little deterrent effect. By the late nineteenth century the rehabilitation model of criminal
sentencing came to the fore based upon the belief that experts in criminology and psy-
chiatry could treat and correct offenders.
But the pendulum swung again in the early 1970s, in response to criticism that the
rehabilitation model was a failure, and that indeterminate sentencing resulted in unwar-
ranted disparities.
In the post-Civil War era, Congress began to expand into areas traditionally within
the ambit of the states' police powers. But there has been a substantial surge in the number
of federal crimes since 1970. According to an American Bar Association report, more than
forty percent of the federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been
enacted since 1970. The Federalist Society issued a report that the number of federal
crimes increased by thirty percent from 1980 and 2004. Between 1980 and 2003, the
number of cases and defendants in the federal system had more than doubled, with the
number of criminal cases increasing 240 percent and the number of criminal defendants
increasing 230 percent. The increase in drug and firearms cases has been especially steep.
Drug cases have grown from 3,130 in 1980 to 11,520 in 2003, and firearms cases have
increased from 931 prosecutions in 1980 to 3,620 in 2003. See Susan R. Klein, Shiting
Powers in the Federal Courts-The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39
VAL. U.L. REv. 693 (2005). Thus, although determinate sentencing sought to eradicate
disparities, federalization of crimes created new possibilities for disparate treatment.
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It is also problematic that the focus of Project Safe Neighborhoods
on street-level crimes for which there is concurrent state jurisdiction
means that uniquely federal crimes are not pursued. States generally have
the resources to pursue Project Safe Neighborhoods' cases.18 6 Many of
Project Safe Neighborhoods cases originate through state and local law
enforcement efforts. The cases often go through state courts, and only
upon a defendant refusing a state plea offer is the case referred for federal
prosecution. Thus, federal prosecutors are pursuing cases for which there
are laws and resources to prosecute in state courts, while virtually ignor-
ing the majority of federal gun laws.
It should be noted that the issue as raised here is not whether tough
enforcement of existing gun laws is effective and/or good policy. The
point is that where state gun laws can be vigorously enforced and at the
same time ensure some level of uniformity and fairness, why focus federal
enforcement efforts exclusively on these crimes? Substantial opportunity
costs are incurred when federal resources that could be used to combat
uniquely federal crimes-like interstate gun trafficking--are used instead
on cases that could be handled effectively by state and local authorities.
Nor do I intend to suggest that federal prosecutors should not en-
force federal crimes because states have concurrent jurisdiction." As
noted above, the criticism is that the myopic enforcement of only street-
level gun crimes in select communities is not justifiable. Federal prosecu-
tors have always operated under guidelines suggesting that serious,
complex, and/or high-level criminal activity is their appropriate focus. As
noted above: "[w]hat every prosecutor is practically required to do is to
select the cases for prosecution and to select those in which the offense is
the most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof the most
certain."' 88 Prosecutors may not cede this imperative for the sake of ease
and efficiency. Criteria for exercising their broad discretion can and
should be geography and race-neutral.
Finally, the integrity of the Government is at stake when policies
persist despite evidence that African American communities are singled
out for disparate treatment. The difficulty in proving violations of equal
186. The district court noted in the Project Exile case United States v. Jones that:
"[w]hile vigorous prosecution of firearms offenses has undoubtedly contributed to some
unascertainable decline in the city's murder rate, there is no compelling reason to suspect
that a comparable effort by local prosecutors would not achieve a comparable effect." See
Jones, 36 F Supp. 2d at 313.The City of Richmond attorney acknowledged that he pos-
sessed every institutional tool necessary to effectively prosecute cases that were diverted to
federal court under Project Exile. Id. at 316.
187. It can and has been argued, of course, that federal prosecutions of traditionally
state crimes such as those involved with Project Safe Neighborhoods is a problem of over-
federalization. See Healy, supra note 12, and Jones, 36 E Supp. 2d at 313-16.
188. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 728.
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protection does not ameliorate the recognition that differential treatment
occurs and is wrong.'8
Unfortunately, the policies of disparate treatment of African Ameri-
cans date back to this country's origins.1 90 But worse, they persist in
several law enforcement and prosecution policies today.1 91
As noted in Armstrong and other cases, by the American Bar Associa-
tion, the United States Sentencing Commission, and in numerous
scholarly publications, enforcement of the federal crack cocaine laws have
had a disparate impact on African Americans, both in terms of the penal-
ties under the statute and by selective enforcement that targets African
American communities.19 2 The disproportion remains despite overwhelm-
ing evidence that African Americans are not the majority users of crack
cocaine and that the penalty variance is not justified by objective stan-
dards.
193
African Americans are more likely to face the death penalty in the
United States, and not just in the State of Georgia. 194 Several cases have
189. The inability of equal protection laws to deal with overtly discriminatory prac-
tices such as those apparent in Project Safe Neighborhoods prosecutions raises serious
questions about the legal framework within which we evaluate claims of discrimination.
Critical race theorists have filly addressed the shortcomings of these laws and offer a
panoply of alternatives that seek to eradicate the realities of discrimination. See KIMBERLE
CRENSHAW, NEIL GOTANDA & GARRY PELLER CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1995).
190. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW (1997) (exploring the his-
tory of race discrimination in the criminal justice system).
191. See KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME (1998) (analyzing how racism
continues to undermine society's criminal justice system).
192. See Nkechi Taifa, Cracked Justice: A Critical Examination of Cocaine Sentencing, 27
UWLA L. REV. 107 (1996). See also U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Special Report to Congress:
Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy xi (1995).The United States Sentencing Commis-
sion pronounced that "federal sentencing data leads to the inescapable conclusion that
blacks comprise the largest percentage of those affected by the penalties associated with
crack cocaine." Id. at xii. The Commission found that the high percentage of Blacks con-
victed of crack cocaine offenses is "a matter of grave concern." Id.
193. Statistics from the National Institute on Drug Abuse reveal that the greatest
number of documented crack users is White. Id. at 38, citing National Institute on Drug
Abuse, Overview of the 1991 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (1991). See also
Sam Meddis, Is the Drug War Racist? Disparities Suggest the Answer is Yes, USA ToDAY,July 23,
1993, at IA ("Although law enforcement officials say blacks and whites use drugs at nearly
the same rate, a USA TODAY computer analysis of 1991 drug arrests found that the war
on drugs has, in many places, been fought mainly against blacks.... USA TODAY first
studied the issue four years ago and found blacks, about 12 percent of the population,
made up almost 40 percent of those arrested on drug charges in 1988, up from 30 percent
in 1984.The new analysis, which uses city-by-city racial breakdowns from the 1990 census
and arrest data from police agencies that report to the FBI, found that by 1991 the pro-
portion of blacks arrested for drugs increased to 42 percent.")
194. See David C. Baldus and George Woodward, Race Discrimination in the Admini-
stration of the Death Penalty:An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the
Post-1990 Research, 41 No. 2 Crim. Law Bulletin 6 (2005).
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attacked this "policy" as well, in that the disproportionate numbers do not
correlate to any objective factors, strongly evidencing racial discrimina-
tion in seeking the death penalty.
And racial profiling has confirmed the long-held suspicion in most
African American communities that members of this minority are singled
out by law enforcement.1 9 After substantial statistical studies reflecting
that African Americans are disproportionately singled out for traffic stops,
there has been some effort by law enforcement agencies and courts to
eradicate this practice.1
96
Project Safe Neighborhoods comes on the heels of these question-
able policies and exacerbates a well-documented problem-African
Americans being treated differently than members of other communities,
in disproportionate numbers for disproportionately harsh treatment. And
Project Safe Neighborhoods goes further than many of these practices,
even acknowledging its singular focus on African American communities.
Existing firearms laws should be enforced, but not selectively against
minority communities. Criminal defendants should be punished, but pun-
ished fairly. Justice cannot at once be blind and look through a narrow
lens at minority communities. The presumed justifications for targeting
African American communities are almost certainly outweighed by gen-
eral principles of fairness and justice. Separate treatment in every context
might not be inherently unequal, but where separate treatment is in-
tended to exact unequal punishment, the effect and the purpose is to
discriminate.
CONCLUSION
Project Safe Neighborhoods is a program that goes a step further
than several other policies in this country's criminal justice system that
have had a disparate impact on African Americans. It specifically targets
African American communities with the goal of providing harsher treat-
ment against those within those communities.
Courts considering the issue have applied the two-part test for prov-
ing violations of equal protection through selective prosecution: by
requiring proof of disparate impact, as well as proof of purposeful dis-
crirination. These tests have predictably made challenges to Project Safe
195. See Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Y Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and
Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2002).
196. See Paul Gottbrath, Racial Lawsuits Prompt Change, THE CINCINNATI POST, Feb.
26, 2001 (Cincinnati, which has since entered into a Consent Decree to redress complaints
of racial profiling by police officers, considered consent decrees entered into in the follow-
ing locales in response to complaints and evidence of racial profiling: Highland Park,
Illinois, Los Angeles, California, Montgomery County, Maryland, the State of Maryland




Neighborhoods' unsuccessfiul. But the stringent requirements of proof of
similarly-situated non-prosecuted individuals and racial animus are not
required because Project Safe Neighborhoods' target in minority com-
munities is tantamount to race-based targeting. The challenge to courts is
to consider whether targeting a program geographically can have such
predictable racial implications that the targeting is effectively race-based.
Racial discrimination today is rarely overt, and much has been writ-
ten about unconscious racial discrimination. 97 Whether the underlying
cause of discriminatory policies is conscious or unconscious racism, the
criminal justice system today has consistently reflected the federal and
state governments' failure to treat the interests of African Americans in a
way that assures them equality in treatment.
Where the government intentionally and singularly targets only the
minority population for prosecution, this itself is discriminatory. If this is
not what equal protection is about, then there is little hope that the law
can ever redress the discrimination that continues to be documented in
this Nation.
197. See Charles Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); see also Davis, supra note 71.
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APPENDIX A
THIRTY METROPOLITAN AREAS IN WHICH 60 PERCENT OF AFRICAN
AMERICANS DWELL IN U.S.
City PSN Focus- Page References ' m
Boston, Massachusetts D. Mass. 15-16
Buffalo, New York W.D. N.Y. 23
Chicago, Illinois N.D. III. 10
Cincinnati, Ohio S.D. Ohio 25-26
Cleveland, Ohio N.D. Ohio 25
Columbus, Ohio S.D. Ohio 25-26
Detroit, Michigan E.D. Mich. 16
Gary-Hammond-East Chicago, N.D. Ind. 111N
Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana S.D. Ind. 12
Kansas City, Missouri W.D. Mo. 18-19
Los Angeles-Long Beach, California C.D. Cal. 4
Milwaukee, Wisconsin E.D. Wisc. 36
New York, New York E.D. N.Y. 21-22
Newark, New Jersey D. N.J.__
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania E.D. Pa. 27
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania W.D. Pa. 28
St. Louis, Missouri E.D. Mo. 18
San Francisco-Oakland, California N.D. Cal. 4
Atlanta, Georgia N.D. Ga. 8-9
Baltimore, Maryland D. Md. 15
Birmingham, Alabama N.D. Ala. 1-2
Dallas-Ft. Worth, Texas N.D. Tex.'
Greensboro-Winston Salem, North M.D. N.C. =
Carolina
Houston, Texas S.D. Tex.'
Memphis, Tennessee W.D. Tenn."'
Miami, Florida S.D. Fla. 8
198. PSN (Project Safe Neighborhoods); The resource for data herein and to which
all pages references are made in Appendices A & B is United States Department ofJustice
Archive-Summary of District Gun Violence Reduction Strategies, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/opd/AppendixA.htm, unless otherwise noted.
199. The N.D. Indiana does not reference the cities, but the counties in which they
are situated, Lake and Porter Counties.
200. See PSN in Practice II, 66-68, available at http://www.psn.gov/pubs/pdf/
PSNInPracticelI.pdf#search = percent22psn percent20in percent20practice percent20ll
percent22.
201. Id. at 98-100.
202. Id. at 76-78.
203. Id. at 100-01.
204. Id. at 96-97.
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New Oleans, Louisiana E.D. La. 14
Nortolk-Virginia Beach, Virginia E.D. Va.'
Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida M.D. Fla.
Washington, D.C. Dist. Columbia 6
205. Id. at 106-09.
206. Id. at 22-23.
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF U.S. CITIES WITH 100,000+ POPULATIONS WITH
207OVER 30 PERCENT AFRICAN AMERICAN
City Percentage Black PSN Focus
Gary, Indiana 84.03 N.D. Ind. 11
Detroit, Michigan 81.55 E.D. Mich. 16
Miami Gardens, Florida 80.07 S.D. Fla. r
Birmingham, Alabama 73.46 N.D. Ala. 1-2
Jackson, Mississippi 70.64 S.D. Miss. 18
New Orleans, Louisiana 67.25 E.D. La. 14
Baltimore, Maryland 64.34 D. Md. 15
Memphis, Tennessee 61.41 W.D. Tenn.'
Atlanta, Georgia 61.39 N.D. Ga. 8-9
Washington, D.C. 60.01 Dist. Columbia 6
Richmond, Virginia 57.19 E.D. Va. 34
Savannah, Georgia 57.08 S.D. Ga."'
Newark, New Jersey 53.46 D.N.J. 1
Flint, Michigan 53.27
St. Louis, Missouri 51.20 E.D. Mo. 18
Cleveland, Ohio 50.99 N.D. Ohio 25





Baton Rouge, Louisiana 50.02 M.D. La. 14
Augusta, Georgia 49.75
Montgomery, Alabama 49.63 M.D. Ala. 2
Inglewood, California 47.13
Mobile, Alabama 46.29 S.D. Ala.2 3
Columbia, South Carolina 46.00 D. S.C.
14
Beaumont, Texas 45.85 E.D. Tex. 31
Hampton, Virginia 44.68
Norfolk, Virginia 44.11 E.D. Va.2"
Durham, North Carolina 43.81 M.D. NC.
211
207. Wikipedia Encyclopedia (based on 2000 census data), available at http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/List of_U.S._cities-with_largeAfrican American-populations.
208. Miami Gardens was not incorporated as a city until 2003. See Wikipedia Ency-
clopedia, supra. The PSN targeted city to which reference is made herein is Miami.
209. PSN in Practice, supra at 96-97.
210. Id. at 30-31.
211. Id. at 66-68.
212. Id. at 47-49.
213. Id. at 3-4.
214. Id. at 90-91. Columbia is not specifically referenced, but the county in which
the city is located, Richland County, is targeted.
215. Id. at 106-09.
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216. Id. at 76-78.
217. Id. at 8-9.
218. Id. at 106-09.
219. Id. at 76-78.
220. Id. at 76-78.
221. See U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Florida Press Release, United
States Attorney Launches Project Safe Neighborhoods to Attack Gun Offenses (May 5,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/fln/Press percent20Releases/2003 per-
cent20Press percent20Releases/PSN050503.
222. PSN in Practice, supra at 16-18.
City Percentage Black PSN Focus
Columbus, Georgia 43.74
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 43.22 E.D. Pa. 27
Dayton, Ohio 43.13 S.D. Ohio 25-26
Cincinnati, Ohio 42.92 S.D. Ohio 25-26
Fayetteville, North Carolina 42.42
Little Rock, Arkansas 40.41 E.D. Ark." '
Newport News, Virginia 39.07 E.D. Va."8
Rochester, New York 38.55 W.D. N.Y. 23
Hartford, Connecticut 38.05 D. Conn. 6-7
Greensboro, North Carolina 37.40 M.D. N.C."'
New Haven, Connecticut 37.36 D. Conn. 6-7
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 37.34 E.D. Wisc. 36
Buffalo, New York 37.23 W.D. N.Y. 23
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 37.10 M.D. N.C.m
Chicago, Illinois 36.77 N.D. Il. 10
Chattanooga, Tennessee 36.06 E.D. Tenn. 30
Richmond, California 36.06
Oakland, California 35.66 N.D. Cal. 4
Tallahassee, Florida 34.24 N.D. Fla."'
Louisville, Kentucky 33.01 W.D. Ky. 13
Paterson, New Jersey 32.90
Charlotte, North Carolina 32.72 W.D. N.C. 24
Kansas City, Missouri 31.23 W.D. Mo 18-19
Bridgeport, Connecticut 30.76 D. Conn.m
Huntsville, Alabama 30.21
Kansas City, Kansas 30.12 D. Kan. 13
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